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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Case No. 940190-CA

Plaintiff Appellee,
vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON
n/k/a REBECCA ANN BATIO
CROOKSTON HACKING,

Priority No. 4

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A.
78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953, as amended 1992).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case involves an appeal from the trial judge's order upholding and supporting
a recommendation made by the trial court's domestic relations commissioner, based upon
the status of the record and the default of Defendant/Appellant Hacking. A change of
custody is involved, together with an award of child support and attorney fees.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the District Judge abuse his discretion by failing to set aside Hacking's

default?
2.

Is Appellant Hacking entitled to the privileges of a litigant at this time?

3.

May Appellant raise issues on appeal which were not argued to the District

Judge?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This Court must determine whether or not the lower court committed a clear abuse
of discretion. Miller v. BrocksmitK 825 P.2d 690 (Ut App., 1992); Fackrell v. FackrelL 740
P.2d 1318 (Utah, 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After long-term and continued efforts by Hacking to prevent and discourage contact
with his children by Mr. Crookston, he filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce seeking a change of custody, child support, and attorney fees. Over a six-month
period following service, despite five (5) written notices to file an answer or her default
would be entered, and various verbal requests for an answer, Hacking filed no answer and
her default was entered. Hacking moved to set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b)
(although no default judgment had been entered). Crookston asked for default judgment.
Crookston opposed Hacking's motion, but Hacking ignored Crookston's motion. Hacking's
motion was denied while Crookston's was granted by the Domestic Relations Commissioner.
2

The District Judge upheld the Commissioner's rulings.

Evidence before both the

Commissioner and the District Judge consisted of affidavits and the verified petition,
establishing uncontrovertedly the necessary change of circumstances and best interests of
the children. Hacking has been adjudged guilty of contempt, has not purged herself of
contempt, and is barred from litigant privileges.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were married on April 12,1980. By the summer of 1988, they had

three (3) children. (Verified Complaint, paragraphs 2 and 5, R-2 and R-3)
2.

The marriage suffered difficulties, and on August 13, 1988, Defendant/

Appellant Hacking took the children and absconded with them, leaving no word where she
and the children could be located. She told friends that she would not permit any visitation
until divorce proceedings were finalized. (Verified Complaint, paragraphs 12 through 14,
R-5)
3.

Plaintiff/Appellee Crookston filed his Verified Complaint on September 9,

1988, and obtained a Temporary Order of Visitation on September 13, 1988.

(Verified

Complaint, R-2 through R-7, and Temporary Order of Visitation, R-9 and R-10)
4.

Following appearances by counsel on October 4,1988, Crookston obtained an

"Order of Temporary Visitation". (R-42 through R-45)

3

5.

An evidentiary hearing concerning temporary visitation was held on December

21, 1988, in which Hacking opposed visitation by Crookston, claiming he was physically and
emotionally abusive to the children. The Commissioner found that:
A.

Hacking took the children with her and abandoned the residence of the

parties and did not inform Crookston of her destination.
B.

Crookston did not physically abuse the children, despite Hacking's

contrary claims.
C.

Emotional distress was caused to the children when the parties fought

and quarreled in the children's presence.
As a result of the evidentiary hearing, a Visitation Order was issued on December 30, 1988.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 4 through 6, R-83 through R-88, at
R-84; and Visitation Order, R-89 through R-91)
6.

Trial was set for September 14, 1989, but was vacated because Crookston and

Hacking were attempting reconciliation.

(Stipulation to Vacate Trial Setting, R-96; and

Order Vacating Trial Setting, R-97 and R-98)
7.

Efforts at reconciliation failed.

An agreed resolution was reached and

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce were executed by the
Court on September 13, 1990, and entered on September 28, 1990. (R-116 through R-126)
8.

Within six (6) weeks of the execution of the final divorce documents, Hacking

left the State of Utah under the following conditions:
4

A.

She lied to Crookston about her living circumstances, saying she was

living with "Cindy" when she and the children were really living with Scott Hacking,
to whom she was not married.

(Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, paragraph

5, R-129 through R-133, at R-130)
B.

Crookston was not permitted to visit with the children after the

October 27-28, 1990 weekend.

(Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, paragraph

6, supra, at R-30)
C

She moved to the State of Washington, but refused to make her

address known to Crookston or friends.

(Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce,

paragraph 8, supra, at R-130)
D.

She stated several times that Crookston should have no contact with

her or the children, using words like "she and the kids should get on with their lives,
without you".

Her purpose in going to Washington and hiding there was to

terminate Crookston's relationship with his children.

(Petition to Modify Decree

of Divorce, paragraph 9, supra, at R-130 and R-131)
9.

Crookston filed his first Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce in January of

1991. Because he had no access to her address, he was forced to take steps to acquire it
from the Office of Recovery Services by a subpoena duces tecum. The address was
obtained, and an Order to Show Cause was served on Hacking at the new address. (See
Motion for Service by Publication, R-134 through R-136; Motion for Order to Show Cause,
5

and for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum, R-137 and R-138); Affidavit of Michael
Eugene Crookston, R-139 through R-142; Order to Show Cause, R-143 and R-144; and
Affidavit/Proof of Service, R-148)
10.

After service of the Order to Show Cause on her, Hacking agreed to provide

contact and visitation (after a five-month hiatus in the same) and the hearing on the Order
to Show Cause was continued without date. (See Order Continuing Hearing, dated April
1, 1991, approved by Stephen W. Julien, then attorney for Hacking, R-149 and R-150)
11.

On October 10, 1991, Utah Legal Services, Inc., acting through attorney

Kenneth E. Bresin, was permitted to withdraw from Hacking's representation because she
failed to keep contact with her attorneys, did not informed them of her then-current address
or phone number, and failed to respond to their letters asking her to contact them.
(Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, R-151; Notice of Hearing for Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel, R-152 and R-153; and Order Allowing Withdrawal as Counsel, R-154 and R-155)
12.

In or about March of 1991, Hacking moved back to Utah. She made various

moves within Utah thereafter. (Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, paragraph
4B(4) through (6), R-160 through R-165, at R-161 and R-162)
13.

On or about March 16, 1992, Hacking again absconded from the State of

Utah, leaving no forwarding address and taking the children with her. (Verified Petition
to Modify Decree of Divorce, paragraph 4B(8), supra, at R-162)
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14.

Plaintiff filed his Verified Petition Modify Decree of Divorce on May 4, 1992.

(R-160 through R-165)
15.

Hacking was served personally with the Summons and Verified Petition to

Modify Decree of Divorce, in North Bend, Oregon, on May 5, 1992. She was served at
2267 Sherman, North Bend, Oregon. (See Affidavit/Proof of Service, R-167)
16.

She was served with a 30-day Summons. The time for answering said

Summons expired on or about June 4, 1992. (See Summons, R-166)
17.

At approximately the expiration of time for Appellant Hacking to answer,

counsel for Crookston received a telephone call from an attorney in Northern Utah,
believed to be Richard S. Clark, II. Said attorney indicated that he was representing
Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, and inquired as to whether Mr. Crookston would consent
to a change of venue to Northern Utah. (See paragraph 5, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop,
R-192 through R-197, at R-193)
18.

Willard R. Bishop forgot the name of the attorney who telephoned him, and

because no address or telephone number had been given, could not follow the matter up.
(See paragraphs 5 and 6, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-193)
19.

On June 30, 1992, in an effort to get matters moving forward, counsel for

Crookston executed a "Notice of Intent to Enter Default" which indicated that within 10
days of June 30, 1992, he intended to enter Defendant's default, unless an appropriate

7

response was filed.

(See Notice of Intent to Enter Default, R-168 and R-169 and

paragraph 7, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-193)
20.

A copy of the "Notice of Intent to Enter Default", along with a letter from Mr.

Crookston's counsel, was sent to Mrs. Rebecca A. Crookston, at 2267 Sherman, North
Bend, Oregon 97459, on June 30, 1992. Mrs. Crookston/Hacking was requested to contact
her attorney, if she had one, and have him get in touch with Mr. Crookston's attorney. No
appearance had ever been filed by any attorney in connection with pending matters, insofar
as representation of Hacking was concerned.

(See paragraph 8, Affidavit of Willard R.

Bishop, supra, at R-193 and R-194, and letter, at R-198)
21.

On or about July 1, 1992, Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, telephoned Crookston's

counsel's office. His counsel was not in. Crookston's counsel dictated a letter to Mr. Clark,
documenting the prior contact. In his letter of July 7, 1992, Crookston's counsel recited the
fact that Mr. Clark was going to prepare documentation concerning a possible change of
venue, and that Defendant/Appellee's attorney was going to contact Mr. Crookston
concerning such a change of venue, and informed Mr. Clark that Mr. Crookston would not
consent to such a change. Crookston's attorney then requested, in writing, that Mr. Clark
enter an appearance in behalf of Hacking, if he was going to be representing her. He also
requested that a response to the petition be filed promptly.

(See paragraph 9, Affidavit

of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-194, and letter of July 7, 1992, to Mr. Richard S. Clark,
II, at R-201 and R-202)
8

22.

Nothing occurred between July 7, 1992 and July 27, 1992. On July 27, 1992,

Mr. Crookston's attorney wrote to Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, and requested that a formal
response be filed on or before August 1, 1992, and indicated that if it was not, he intended
to enter the default of Mrs. Crookston. (See paragraph 10, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop,
supra, at and copy of letter of July 27, 1992, at R-203)
23.

During late July or early August of 1992, Mr. Richard S. Clark contacted Mr.

Crookston's attorney. Mr. Clark stated that he had checked out the law, and that there
would be no motion for change of venue filed. Mr. Clark agreed that venue must remain
in Washington County. (See paragraph 11, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-195)
24.

Also in late July and early August of 1992, Mr. Crookston's attorney spoke

several times with Mr. Clark concerning the exercise of summer visitation by Mr. Crookston.
That visitation was eventually worked out.

(See paragraph 12, Affidavit of Willard R.

Bishop, supra, at R-195)
25.

No statement was ever made by Plaintiff/Appellee's lawyer that Hacking would

not be required to file an answer. On various occasions, Mr. Clark stated that an answer
would be filed shortly. No answer was ever filed. (See paragraph 13, Affidavit of Willard
R. Bishop, supra, at R-195)
26.

On or about November 3, 1992, Crookston's attorney wrote to Mr. Richard

S. Clark, II, and stated that unless an answer was filed within five days of November 3,
1992, he was going to enter the default of Hacking. That letter was never returned by the
9

United States Postal Service, and was sent to the address at which Crookston's attorney had
previously had written communication with Richard S. Clark, II.

(See paragraph 14,

Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-195)
27.

On November 13, 1992, when no answer had been filed, Plaintiffs attorney

sent a Default Certificate to the Clerk of Court. The default of Defendant Rebecca Ann
Batio Crookston (Hacking) was entered on or about November 17, 1992. (See paragraph
15, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-195)
28.

Sometime between November 18, 1992, and November 24, 1992, Willard R.

Bishop received a telephone call from Mr. Richard S. Clark, IL Mr. Clark wanted to know
the status of the case. Mr. Bishop informed Mr. Clark that a Default Certificate had been
entered on November 17, 1992. (See paragraph 16, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra,
at R-196)
29.

Mr. Clark then stated he would file a motion to set aside the default. He

asserted that no answer had been filed because he could not get Rebecca Ann Batio
Crookston to return to him a verified response, and indicated that he, himself, was
undergoing domestic difficulties. (See paragraph 17, Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, supra,
at R-196)
30.

When Plaintiffs attorney received no motion to set aside the default from Mr.

Clark, he had no alternative except to move forward. On January 18, 1993, he took steps
to file a "Motion for Default Judgment".

(See paragraph 18, Affidavit of Willard R.
10

Bishop, supra, at R-196; Motion for Default Judgment, R-178 through R-180; and Affidavit
of Willard R. Bishop, R-173 through R-177)
31.

In his Motion for Default Judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Willard R.

Bishop, and the Affidavit of Michael Eugene Crookston:
A.

Asked that custody be changed;

B.

Requested an award of child support per the applicable guidelines,

using income imputed to Hacking at minimum wage; and
C

Asked for an award of costs and attorney fees.

At no time before or at the time of the hearing on the Motion for Default Judgment by
Commissioner Lema did Hacking or her attorneys file any objection to the relief requested,
or object to it in any way. (See record prior to November 18, 1993)
32.

At all times following July 27, 1992, copies of documents generated by

Crookston's attorney were sent to Richard S. Clark, II, even after the entry of Hacking's
default. Those documents were sent to the only address which had ever been provided by
Richard S. Clark, II, which was 590 North 700 West, Provo, Utah 84601. Copies of the
same documents were sent directly to Mrs. Hacking, also, since Mr. Clark had never entered
a formal appearance for her. None of those documents were ever returned to Crookston's
attorney by the United States Postal Service. (See paragraph 19, Affidavit of Willard R.
Bishop, supra, at R-196)
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33.

On or about Tuesday, February 16, 1993, Crookston's attorney received

certain documents from Richard S. Clark, II, in which he was informed that Mr. Clark's
address was to be 1805 North Oakridge Lane, Provo, Utah 84604. This was the first time
that information was ever provided, to the effect that Mr. Clark's address was anything
other than 590 North 700 West, Provo, Utah 84601.

(See paragraph 20, Affidavit of

Willard R. Bishop, supra, at R-196 and R-197)
34.

On February 18, 1993, Hacking, through Mr. Clark, filed her Motion to Set

Aside Default Judgment and her Memorandum In Support of Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment, claiming "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" under Rule
60(b)(1). (R-181 through R-184)
A.

Mr. Clark claimed in his memorandum:

That a verified answer was sent to Hacking, but was not returned

because of her "relocation". (R-182)
B.

That Clark was separated and divorced in the fall of 1992 and did not

thereafter receive correspondence mailed to his prior address.
C.

(R-183)

That Clark's failure to communicate a new address to Crookston's

lawyer was "excusable neglect". (R-183)
D.

That communication with Hacking was difficult because of moves she

made, the implication being that Hacking failed to stay in touch with him. (R-183)
35.

In his "Affidavit of Richard S. Clark, II", Mr. Clark stated:
A.

That he received the "verified complaint" (sic) from Hacking. (R-185)
12

B.

That he separated in the summer of 1992, but left his mailing address

at 590 North 700 West in Provo, when IK pinions!', Innl
that she did not give him his mail
C.

ll. L ,'ili1 iiiijil'iiiig

(R-186)

1

Crookston. (R-186)
D.

1

nt several verified answers to Ilacking, which

were returned by the Postal Service. (R-186)
E.

That Hacking received the Motion for Default Judgment, contacted

him, gave him her address and pi mi in iiumhi i iiml lh I I In i " ^nuld In i Itn lilim
"problems communicating with (his) client." (R-186)
36.

CI.ill | i pmii i| in hit in 'i in in i in I \ ii| in mi in Mumiili, Decree of Divorce.

The document was not venfied, despite his prior insistence that Hacking should file a
verified answer. Hacking was in default, and no permission of Court was ever obtained to
file that document (R-187 through R-188) Later
the question, of whether or not Clark was entitled to practice law in February of 1993.
(R-249; R-340, lines 20 tin < >ugh 22)
37.

All pending motions were thereaftei set for hearing before Commissioner

li mi i i in in I mi I mi mi1
38.

INI i IN i HI in i n t ( 1 c i i i i i i u , , i< ; i i i .ill ni I in in

mi i

A day oi two before July 15, 1993, Mr. Clark contacted Mr. Bishop. Clark

indicated he had a problem with his bar status and tried to force a choice of placing the
13

case on "hold" until he was back in good standing, or withdrawing from the case. Mr. Clark
was told that he should do what he had to do, but that Mr. Crookston would move ahead.
Clark said he would withdraw immediately, but did not do so. (R-361, lines 14 through 25)
It is questionable whether he could withdraw without Court permission.
39.

Counsel for Crookston appeared on July 15, 1993. Over his objection, the

matter was continued because Clark apparently had an ex parte contact with the
Commissioner the night before.
40.

(R-218, and R-362, lines 1 through 6)

Clark finally faxed a Notice of Withdrawal to the Clerk on August 5, 1993.

(R-219)
41.

Hacking was given an appropriate Notice to Appoint Counsel or Represent

Self on August 27, 1993. (R-222 and R-223)
42.

All pending matters were noticed for hearing on November 18, 1993. (R-229

and R-230)
43.

On or about November 18, 1993, the district court, in the person of the

Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations Commissioner, entered default judgment
in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant.

The default judgment awarded

Plaintiff/Appellee Michael Eugene Crookston the care, custody, and control of Brian
Michael Crookston, Andrea Christine Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston, the
parties' minor children. Defendant/Appellant was required to pay to Plaintiff, reasonable
child support in accordance with the applicable guidelines which eventually worked out to
14

the amount o- ;

' ner month. Plaintiff was awarded judgment for his reasonable

attorney fees and costs of court, being $361.98 attorney fees and $55.00

g

$416.98. The Commissioner also signed an Order Overruling and Denying Motion to Set
Aside Default. (R-244 through R-249; .i nl iiarayitiph I I miliums ml 1 ,inl ,i imJ t run [tisfuiis
of Law, R-430 through R-437, at R-431)
N<» I,11'41 |(|i M» N«,n ruth/i ,!:\ 1*I*H, Rebecca

44.

icikston Hacking had

personal knowledge and notice of the judgment awarding the custody of the children to Mr.
Crookston. That notice was provided to her by her attorney, Mr. Stephen W. Julien, both
by telephonic communication and by mail. She also knew dial (lie t HIH(\ nnln injuni'il
that physical custody of the children be delivered to Mr. Crookston, and at all times had the
abil

i

]er,

(Paragraph 2, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra, at R-431 and R-432)
45.

Frc m. i md i iftei i eceiving knowledge and notice of the Court's order, Ms

Hacking failed and refused to deliver the children to Mr. Crookston, and failed and refused
to cooperate with his efforts to obtain the physical custody of the children. Mr. Crookston
made telephone calls, wrote letters, and involved Ins jffoniu \ m dtoils In iihl.iin pliysinil
custody of the children. ' ' without success.
Conclusions
46.

(Paragraph 3, Findings of Fact and

432)
As the result of a hearing held before the Honorable James L. Shumate,

Disliirl I idgi, oil I'ebruary 22, 1994 , said District Judge affirmed and upheld the order of

the Domestic Relations Commissioner awarding custody to Plaintiff.

(Order Overruling

and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner, R-262 through R-264) That
order was executed and filed on or about March 7, 1994. Following the entry of the order
made by the Honorable James L. Shumate, and despite her knowledge and ability to comply
therewith, Hacking continued to fail and refuse to turn the children over to Plaintiff.
(Paragraph 4, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra, at 432).
47.

As a result of Defendant's failure to abide by the orders of the lower Court,

Mr. Crookston was forced to make two trips to the State of Oregon in his efforts to obtain
the custody of his children. Hacking continued to evade her responsibilities, and continued
her efforts to prevent him from obtaining the physical custody of his children. (Paragraph
5, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra, at R-432)
48.

Mr. Crookston's first trip to Oregon took place between March 23, and April

2, 1994. During the first trip, he obtained a writ of assistance from the appropriate District
Court in the State of Oregon, but despite the cooperation and assistance of the appropriate
sheriffs office, was unable to locate and obtain physical custody of the children. Hacking
hid herself and the children to avoid Plaintiff and his efforts to obtain the children.
(Paragraph 6, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, above, at R-432 and R-433)
49.

Crookston thereafter was required to return again to the State of Oregon, to

pick up the children after the Sheriff's office had located and taken them into custody. He
finally succeeded in obtaining physical custody of the children on April 8, 1994. Since April
16

8, 1994, the three children have been in his physical care, custody, and control. (Paragraph
7, Findings

)

50.

At an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable James L. Shumate, District

j.< ...

'

djudged to be guilty of

contempt of court. She was not incarcerated, but was allowed the opportunity to purge
liei

i contempt by paying Mr. Ci ookston his damages. Ms. Hacking has been

permanently restrained and enjoined from removing the childre 11 limn I "I.IIII unhmii Cmni
or Mr. Crookston's permission. She has also been barred by Court order from seeking any
court relief, until

yet done so.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R-430 through R-437; and Judgment and Orders,
R--H8 (liiiiiijpji K III)
51.

Ms. Hacking is now under a Judgment for Delinquent Child Suppo I i i l!

amount of $*>2"'' ' /, which she has not paid

(Judgment for Delinquent Child Support,

R-442 through R-444)
52.

Ms. Hacking in her "Statement of Issues" claims that the lower court erred in

not making

eaching the decision

to change custody, in Imputing a minimum wage for child support purposes without a
li»%"

in,! t\\\ .ij diiif:?, <ii 1' »i iiry lees without an evidentiary hearing. Those questions were

never presented to the Commissioner, noi were they ever argued 1 1 he IH'.lin I Imtyy
They are raised for the first time on appeal
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(See Reporter's Hearing Transcript,

November 18,1993, R-332 through R-343; and Reporter's Hearing Transcript, February 22,
1994, R-344 through R-368)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After no less than five (5) written notices to respond to the Verified Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce and various verbal requests that a response be filed, Rebecca
Crookston Hacking was in default and her default was properly entered.

Both the

Commissioner and the District Judge exercised their discretion properly, and did not abuse
discretion in refusing to set aside the default certificate. Appellant Hacking has ignored the
real question of whether an abuse of discretion was committed, and wants to argue issues
which are not pertinent to a default situation. Issues concerning alleged need for findings
of fact concerning the custody change, imputation of minimum wage for child support
purposes, and awarding attorney fees without an evidentiary hearing cannot be argued for
the first time on appeal. Such arguments do not apply in a default situation where no
opposition is timely raised anyway. Appellant Hacking cannot take advantage of her own
delicts and is, in any event, guilty of unclean hands and in contempt of court with respect
to which she has not purged herself. She is not entitled to the privileges of a litigant and
is barred from requesting relief from the courts until she has cleaned herself. Her pattern
of conduct in trying to sever the father-child relationship bars her, also, from her requested
relief.

18

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DIRECT RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANT
HACKING
L

111 ii siUiiihoii " lint1 ii drl'aiilt has btviii mined iiiiiii, i ml is required to go to

trial or take testimony where, as here, the uncontroverted evidence in the Verified Petition
^rce st'--

to

^ne, was necessarily deemed to u~ +~"" and

established the necessary substantial change of material circumstances and be • * -

' s i if

the children. See Stevens v. Collard. 837 P.2d 593 (Utah App., 1992), at 595, which states:
"Read in conjunction with one another, Utah R.Civ.P. 55(a)(1) •
and (b)(2) state that "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment
for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend as provided by these rules," "the party entitled to a
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor." Further,
when allegations set forth in a pleading are not contested by
the opposing party, those allegations are deemed admitted. See
Utah R.Civ.P. 9(d) ("[A]verments in a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading."); Murdoch v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484
P.2d 164, 169 (1971) (when a party fails to respond to a
pleading, allegations in the pleading are "deemed admitted
under Rule 8(d)")."
The trial court then went on to determine from the unconti
best interests of the children were served by the change of custody.
Whe

ltroverted

fact that, "The change of custody from Defendant to Plaintiff is in the best interest of the
19

parties' minor children", (See paragraph 5, Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce,
R-163), no other findings or conclusions are required.
2.

A case cannot be set for trial so long as a default exists.

3.

The question of the award of child support and attorney fees is included in

those matters covered by default. Evidence was taken, however in the form of affidavits
which were not contested at the time of the hearing on Mr. Crookston's Motion for Default
Judgment.
4.

UCA 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (1953, as amended) applies only to imputation of income

for child support calculations, not for an award of attorney fees.
5.

Appellant Hacking asserts as error, alleged failure of the lower court to make

findings of fact or conclusions of law as to steps taken in reaching a decision to change
custody, in imputing a minimum wage to Hacking without conducting any evidentiary
hearing on her earnings, and awarding attorney fees without taking evidence on the financial
situation of the parties and the reasonableness of the fee. First, Hacking had and has no
standing to raise those issues, being in default. Second, evidence was taken as to the
reasonableness of the fee ($361.98!). Thirdly, Hacking did not file anything against or argue
against the matters requested in Crookston's Motion for Default Judgment, so she can't
complain now that such relief was granted. Fourthly and finally, the arguments treated in
this numbered paragraph were never argued to either the Commissioner or the District
Judge, as is clearly shown by the transcripts of hearings before each. Defenses and claims
20

not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Bangerter v.
Poultorh 663 P.2d 100 (Utah, 1983). Whei
that the trial court reached or ruled on an issue, the Court of Appeals will not undertake

6.

No permission was ever granted Hacking to file her "Answer to Petition to

Modify Decree of Divorce . In any event the document was not verified and could not raise
any issue against Mr. Crookston's "Verified Petition to Modify Dec
7.

- '

Hacking is barred by the actions or failures of her attorneys, as are all parties.
POINT II
THE ACTION OF THE DISTRICT JUDGE WAS NOT AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Appellant Hacking tins noticeably failed Id JHIIIIIII! mil .HI , \\A\ iiiiiii .'i liiidli t lit' at lion iiilir

the District Judge, or the Commissioner, constituted any abuse of discretion.
A ttiiil u mil1 iiiliiiji, on a motion 1 ".el iisidc ii iJdl.iiill involves the trial court's

discretionary power, and the Court of Appeals will not disturb the trial court's decision
absent clear abuse of discretion. Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690 (Utah App., 1992)
Hacking's motion was purportedly brought under URCP 60(b)(l ), claiming mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. She failed to establish any such grounds.
A default |udp(meiil is pi ope i w hrie a ileienrhnl demon <1rales imlifiemiee iiiiii Il hi II'

of diligence in pursuing his or her opportunity to defend. Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1192

(Utah, 1984). In Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah, 1973), the Utah
Supreme Court held that it was not error to refuse to set aside a default judgment where
a defendant failed to contact his attorney, even despite a claim that the attorney was unable
to contact the defendant due to the defendant's long-working hours and his custom of
visiting his wife who was terminally ill with cancer. Further, in Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d
855 (Utah, 1979), a motion to set aside default judgment was properly denied where the
defendant offered no reasonable excuse for his nonappearance, failed to respond to
repeated attempts to contact him concerning status of the lawsuit he knew was pending, and
knew that he had no attorney.
In this case, Hacking and her attorney were notified in writing no less than five (5)
times, and various times over the phone, that an answer would be required. Those include
(1) the Summons served on Defendant 5/5/92; (2) the Notice of Intent to Enter Default
dated June 30, 1992; (3) the letter to Mr. Clark of 7/7/92; (4) the letter to Mr. Clark of
7/27/94; and (5) the letter to Mr. Clark of 11/3/92. The Court certainly did not abuse its
discretion by failing to vacate Hacking's default when she had so very many opportunities
to avoid default.
As Crookston sees it, Hacking is asking that her default be set aside because of the
neglect of her attorney to provide opposing counsel with his new address, and her own
neglect in failing to stay in touch with her attorney. Those claims do not constitute
"mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect".
22

POINT III
HACKING IS BARRED FROM PROSECUTING HER
APPEAL BECAUSE SHE HAS UNCLEAN HANDS, IS
GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, HAS NOT PURGED
HERSELF OF THAT CONTEMPT, AND IS NOT ENTITLED
TO PRIVILEGES AS A LITIGANT.
T h e Honorable James L. Shumate held Hacking in contempt of court for her willful
disobedience of the trial court's orders. I ho trial court provided an opportunity for her t o
purge herself of contempt, of which she has failed t o avail herself. T h e trial

I

her from seeking judicial relief until she has purged herself of contempt. (Findings of Fact
<

It is generally accepted that equity refuses to lend its aid to a party whose conduct

effort to remove children from t h e State of Utah. A s a result, t h e Utah Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's decision severely restricting his visitation rights, because h e was in
contempt of court for failuie ft* pny i lliiiiiliiil 'iip| ml .in Il III' i .ill In iiiplm^ In n iiii i III
children.
In Bake/ \. Huh t, 2/1 P \i I""' (Hi, in, Pi'.ll), Hn Ui.ili Supreme ( ui it stated, at
page 2:
"It is a general rule that a party who is in contempt will not be
heard by the Court when he wishes to make a motion or grant
a favor, and if a party files a pleading while in contempt, it will
be stricken from the file on motion."

23

That position continues to be good Utah law. In Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P.2d 1132
(Utah, 1977), the Utah Supreme Court again stated, probably quoting from Baker:
"It is the general rule that a party in contempt will not be heard
by the Court when he wishes to make a motion or grant a
favor."
In this case, the actions of Hacking are simply inexcusable. Beginning with the
opening salvo back in 1988, she has routinely and continuously done everything she could
to thwart the rights of Mr. Crookston, destroy his relationship with his children contrary to
their best interests, and to disobey the orders of the Court. This Court cannot honor any
request she now makes, unless and until such time as she purges herself of contempt of
Court. To hold otherwise would be to condone Hacking's contumacious conduct, and
further encourage her disobedience of the law, to the harm of Crookston and the children.
CONCLUSIONS
Hacking is not entitled to request any relief from this Court because of her unpurged
contempt.

She has not established any ground for relief under URCP 60(b)(1), and

certainly has not established any clear abuse of discretion by the Honorable James L.
Shumate, District Judge. She cannot raise issues on appeal for the first time. The change
of custody is appropriate and called for in every way. The children are thriving with their
father, having been in his home since April 8, 1994. Other orders made by the trial court
are appropriate and proper in all respects. Hacking's appeal should be dismissed, and this

24

Court should remand the case to Judge Shumate to determine an appropriate amount of
attorney fees and costs to be awarded Crookston in ( mini i lion uiili (In appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this H H - day/ of August, 1994.

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ f f L day of August, 1994,1 delivered two full,
true and correct copies of the foregoing "Brief of Appellee Michael Eugene Crookston", to
theoffiK Mi Strphi n V\ lulu ii I M| ill I l.ih I civil
Cedar City, Utah 84720.
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,

)

Plaintiff,

VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.

)
)
)

REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON,

)

Civil No. 884502229DA

Defendant.
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, who represents and petitions the Court as
follows:
1.

On or about September 13, 1990, the above-entitled Court

executed its Decree of Divorce in this action.
2.

Among

other

things, the Decree

of

Divorce

awarded

Defendant the care, custody, and control of the parties' minor
children,

being

Brian

Michael

Crookston,

Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston.

Andrea

Christine

Plaintiff was awarded

reasonable rights of visitation, specified in detail in the Decree
of Divorce.
3.

The award of custody and visitation was accomplished by

agreement, pursuant to a certain "Stipulation for Settlement". The
custody and visitation questions in the case were not litigated.
4.

Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, circumstances

with respect to the custody, visitation, and support of the
children have changed substantially, as follows:

/ Co

ooi

A.

Defendant interfered with Plaintiff's rights of

visitation with the children, by falsely informing Plaintiff
of where she and the children were living, and thereafter, by
leaving the State of Utah and not providing Plaintiff with the
address of the children.
B.

Defendant has wrongfully

subjected the parties'

minor children to numerous residents and school changes, as
follows:
(1) At the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce,
Defendant and the children were living with Defendant's
mother in Provo, Utah.

The children were attending

Joaquin School in Provo.
(2)

On

or

about

October

31,

1990, Defendant

absconded from the State of Utah, taking the children
with her, and moved to Tacoma where she resided with one
Scott Hacking, to whom

she was

not married.

The

children, of course, were required to change schools
also.
(3)

In or about the month of February of 1991,

Defendant moved to Coos' Bay, Oregon, where she lived
with either her mother or her grandmother. The children,
of course, were once again required to change schools.
(4)

In or about

the month

of March

of 1991,

Plaintiff returned to Provo to yet another residence,
enrolling the children once again in the Joaquin School.

2
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At this time, she lived with a friend by the name of
"Cindy".
(5)

In or about May of 1991, Defendant moved to yet

another residence in Provo where she resided once again
with Scott Hacking, This move required that the children
be enrolled in Timpanogos Elementary School.
(6) At or about Thanksgiving in November of 1991,
Defendant moved to 2537 South Lakecrest, #2 (1810 West),
West Valley City, Utah 84120, where she lived once again
with Scott Hacking. The children were required to change
to the Redwood Elementary School.
(7)

In or about early March of 1992, Defendant

indicated her desire to move back to Coos' Bay, Oregon,
which would require yet another change of residence and
schools for the children.
(8) On or about March 16, 1992, Defendant absconded
from the State of Utah, leaving no forwarding address and
taking the children with her.
C.

Prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce,

Defendant's housekeeping habits were acceptable. Since then,
however, those habits have deteriorated to the point that the
children are not kept clean and their clothing and environment
emit bad odors.
D,

On or about March 4, 1992, Plaintiff remarried. He

now resides in a home purchased by him at 8845 South 630 East,
Sandy, Utah 84070, and can provide the children with a living
3
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environment superior to that of Defendant, and can provide the
children with a stable, two-parent home, where they will not
be required to make constant moves and constant changes of
school.
5.

The change of custody from Defendant to Plaintiff is in

the best interest of the parties' minor children.
6.

Although it was anticipated at the time the Decree of

Divorce was entered that Defendant would obtain employment, she has
remained

unemployed.

Insofar

receives aid from AFDC.
without benefit

of

as

Plaintiff

knows, Defendant

Scott Hacking, with whom she is living

clergy, receives

some form of disability

payments.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows:
1.

That the Decree of Divorce in this matter be modified as

follows:
A.

To change custody of the parties' minor children

from Defendant to Plaintiff, subject to rights of reasonable
visitation in Defendant.
B.

To provide for child support bo be paid by Defendant

to Plaintiff, in accordance with the applicable guidelines.
2.

That Plaintiff be awarded his attorney fees, costs of

court, and such other and further relief as the Court deems
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
3.

Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

DATED this

day of March, 1992.
MICHAEL EUGEtfE CROOKSTON
4
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of Salt Lake )
COMES NOW MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON, who being first duly sworn
oath, deposes and states that he is the Plaintiff named above, that
he has read and is familiar with the allegations contained in the
within and foregoing Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce,
and that the matters stated in said Petition are true, according to
his own best knowledge, information, and belief.
DATED this S-O

day of March, 1992.

Sfes^
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON
0 j
/-#

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

^

day of March,

1992

NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires:

Residing in:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing document to Mr. Paul F. Graf, Esq.,
Assistant

Attorney

General,

Utah

State

Department

of

Human

Services, Office of Recovery Services, at 168 North 100 East, St.

I^I
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George, Utah 84770, by f i r s t - c l a s s mail, postage fully prepaid t h i s

J T ^ d a v of &£&{ 1992.
<C

0j a

Secretary

y

-

^i^aTTpTur^J
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLARD R.
BISHOP

)
)
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, )

Civil No. 894502229DA
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema

Plaintiff,
vs.

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Iron

)

)
:ss.
)

COMES NOW WILLARD R. BISHOP, who being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant is an adult, male resident of Iron County, State of Utah, fully

competent to testify concerning matters set forth hereafter and makes this affidavit upon
personal knowledge.
2.

Affiant is a duly licensed member of the Utah State Bar, and is counsel of

record for Plaintiff in this action.

/?£•
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3.

On or about May 5, 1992, Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston was

duly served with process. See "Affidavit/Proof of Service" in the file.
4.

Defendant was served with a 30-day Summons. The time for answering

said Summons expired on or about June 4, 1992.
5.

At approximately the time of expiration of the time to answer, Affiant

received a telephone call from an attorney in Northern Utah. Affiant believes that said
attorney was Richard S. Clark, II. Said attorney indicated that he was representing
Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, and inquired as to whether Affiant would
consent to a change of venue to Northern Utah. Affiant did not note down the name of

4$
the attorney jrffc^called him, and was not given the attorney's address or telephone
number.
6.

Affiant forgot the name of the attorney who telephoned him.

Because

Affiant had no indication concerning the name, address, and telephone number of the
attorney, Affiant could not then contact him.
7.

On June 30, 1992, in an effort to get matters moving forward, Affiant

executed a "Notice of Intent to Enter Default" which indicated that within ten days of June
30,1992, he intended to enter Defendant's default, unless an appropriate response was
filed sooner. See "Notice of Intent to Enter Default" in file.
8.

A copy of the "Notice of Intent to Enter Default", along with a letter from

Affiant, was sent to Mrs. Rebecca A. Crookston, at 2267 Sherman, Northbend, Oregon
2

/95

oos

97459, on June 30, 1992. Copies of the letter to Mrs. Crookston and of the Notice of
Intent to Enter Default are attached, and are incorporated by this reference. In Affiant's
letter to Mrs. Crookston, Affiant requested that she have her attorney, if any, get in touch
with Affiant. No appearance had ever been filed by any attorney in connection with
pending matters.
9.

On or about July 1, 1992, Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, telephoned Affiant's

office. Affiant was not in. Affiant dictated a letter to Mr. Clark, documenting the prior
contact. In Affiant's letter of July 7,1992, Affiant recited the fact that Mr. Clark was going
to prepare documentation concerning a possible change of venue, and Affiant was going
to contact Mr. Crookston concerning such a change of venue, and informed Mr. Clark
that Mr. Crookston would not consent to a change of venue. Affiant then requested, in
writing, that Mr. Clark enter an appearance in behalf of Defendant, if he was going to be
representing her. Affiant also requested, in writing, that a response to the Petition be
filed promptly. See letter of July 7, 1992, to Mr. Richard S. Clark, II.
10.

Nothing occurred between July 7, 1992 and July 27, 1992. On July 27,

1992, Affiant wrote to Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, and requested that a formal response be
filed on or before August 1, 1992, and indicated that if not, Affiant intended to enter the
default of Mrs. Crookston. A copy of the letter of July 27, 1992, is attached and is
incorporated by this reference.

3

11.

During late July or early August of 1992, Affiant was contacted by Richard

S. Clark, II, by telephone. Mr. Clark stated that he had checked out the law, and that
there would be no motion for change of venue filed. Mr. Clark agreed that venue must
remain in Washington County.
12.

Also in late July and early August of 1992, Affiant spoke several times with

Mr. Clark concerning the exercise of summer visitation by Plaintiff. That visitation was
eventually worked out.
13.

Affiant has no recollection that he made any statement or representation

to Richard S. Clark that Defendant would not be required to file an answer. Affiant's
recollection is to the effect, however, that on various occasions, Mr. Clark indicated that
an answer would be filed shortly. No answer was ever filed.
14.

On or about November3,1992, Affiant wrote to Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, and

indicated that unless an answer was filed within five days of November 3, 1992, Affiant
was going to enter the default of Defendant. A copy of that letter is attached, and is
incorporated by this reference. That letter was never returned by the United States
Postal Service, and was sent to the address at which Affiant had previously had written
communications with Richard S. Clark, II.
15.

On November 13, 1992, when Affiant received no answer, Affiant sent a

Default Certificate to the Clerk of Court. The default of Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio
Crookston was entered on or about November 17, 1992. See Court file.
4
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16.

Sometime between November 18, 1992, and November 25, 1992, Affiant

received a telephone call from Mr. Richard S. Clark, II. Mr. Clark wanted to know the
status of the case. Affiant informed Mr. Clark that a Default Certificate had been entered
on November 17, 1992.
17.

Mr. Clark then stated that he would be filing a motion to set aside the

default. He asserted that no answer had been filed because he could not get Rebecca
Ann Batio Crookston to return to him a verified response, and indicated that he, himself,
was undergoing domestic difficulties.
18.

When Affiant received no motion to set aside the default from Mr. Clark,

Affiant had no alternative except to move forward. On January 18, 1993, Affiant took
steps to file a "Motion for Default Judgment".
19.

At all times, following July 27, 1992, copies of documents generated by

Affiant were sent to Richard S. Clark, II, even after the entry of Defendant's default.
Those documents were sent to the only address which had ever been provided by
Richard S. Clark, II, to Affiant, which was 590 North 700 West, Provo, Utah 84601. By
the same token, copies of relevant documents were sent to Defendant, since Mr. Clark
had never entered a formal appearance for her. None of those documents was ever
returned to Affiant by the Postal Service.
20.

On or about Tuesday, February 16, 1993, Affiant received certain

documents from Richard S. Clark, II, in which Affiant was informed that Mr. Clark's
5

address is now 1805 North Oakridge Lane, Provo, Utah 84604. This is the first time
Affiant has ever been informed that Mr. Clark's address was anything other than 590
North 700 West, Provo, Utah 84601.
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
DATED this * f f i t U day of February, 1993.

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this f ^ x f l d a v of February, 1993.
•7**~*'fli *^5*' *&ir y*^**1?^' r^i^cxCfvCs-c^!:-*'
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Expires 11/17/95

NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires:^ 1/17/95
Residing in: Cedar City. Utah

J

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing document to Mr. Richard S,. Clark, II, Esq., Attorney at Law, at 1805 North
Oakridge Lane, Provo, Utah 84604, both by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid this
#TOJiav of February, 1993.

^/(jfcMttJli IMAJZJ
cretary
6
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ATTORNLY AT LAW
36 NORTH 30O WEST
P O BOX 2 7 9
CEDAR

CITY. UTAH

84721

801 /S86 9483

June 30, 1992

Mrs. Rebecca A. Crookston
2267 Sherman
North Bend, OR 97459
RE:

Crookston v. Crookston; My Hie No.
WB88128

Dear Mrs. Crookston:
The purpose of this note is to request that you have your attorney, if any, get in
touch with me to get this matter roiling.
Further, demand is hereby formally made that you provide Mr. Crookston with the
telephone number of the children, so that he may call them as is his right.
Finally, demand is made that you contact Mr. Crookston immediately to arrange
for the children's extended visitation with him.
If you have retained counsel, please discuss this letter with him immediately.
Sincerely yours,
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.

Willard R. Bishop
WRB:em
Enclosures
pc Mr. Michael E. Crookston

rn
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENTER
DEFAULT

vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON,

Civil No. 884502229DA

Defendant.

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, by and througn counsel, and hereby gives notice to
Defendant that within ten days o* the date of this instrument, he intends to enter the
default of Defendant, in connection with Plaintiff's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce, unless an appropriate response is filed sooner.
DATED this Wd

day of June, 1992.

oJ s| WILLARX) R. BISHOP
WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff

199

014

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing document to Mrs. Rebecca Ann Crookston, at 2267 Sherman, North Bend,
Oregon 97459, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid this 30'li

Secretary

day of June, 1992.
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W I I J - A K I ) K. B I S H O P .
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LAW

3 6 NORTH 3G0 WEST
P O BOX 2 79
CEDAR CITY. UTAH

04721

801 /S86-9483

July 7, 1992

Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, Esq.
Attorney at Law
590 North 700 West
Prove, UT 84601
RE:

Crookston v. Crookston; My File
No. WB88128

Dear Mr. Clark:
Thank you for calling my office on July 1, 1992. I regret that I was not in when you
called.
I know that you telephoned several weeks ago. With my understanding that you
were going to prepare documentation concerning a possible change of venue, and that
I would then submit that question to my client for decision. I indicated to you that I
believed that there would be no difficulty v/ith a change of venue.
I then waited to receive documentation from you. I never did receive anything from
you, and frankly, forgot your name since I had not written it down in the case file, you not
having entered any appearance.
Some time ago, v/hen I had received nothing from you, and when I could not recall
your name, I wrote to Mrs. Crookston. I enclose copies of the documents I sent to her.
I have discussed the possibility of a change of venue with Mr. Crookston. He
indicated that he was not agreeable to that, and that he desired to leave the question of
venue where it currently lies, in Washington County.

2*1
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Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, Esq.
Page Two
July 7, 1992

Please enter an appearance in behalf of the former Mrs. Crookston, if you are
going to be representing her. Also, if she has any objection to the relief requested in the
Petition which has been filed, I would appreciate it if you could file a response, promptly.
Very cordially yours,
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.

Willard R. Bishop
WRB:em
pc Mr. Michael E. Crookston
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July 27, 1992

Mr. Richard S. Clark, it, Esq.
Attorney at Law
590 North 700 West
Provo, LIT 84601
RE:

Crookston v. Crookston; My File No.
WB88128

Dear Mr. Clark:
The purpose of this note is simply to remind you that Mr. Crookston is becoming
somewhat disenchanted with the delays in this case. I would appreciate receiving nis
former wife's response on or before August 1, 1992. If not, I intend to enter default.
Mr. Crookston has attempted to contact his former wife to make arrangements for
summer visitation, but has been thwarted. Apparently, his former wife's boyfriend
indicated that visitation arrangements "should go through the lawyers".
Mr. Crookston formerly requests visitation v/ith the children for the month of August
of 1992. ! look forward to your response.
Very cordially yours,
WiLLARD ft BISHOP, P. C.

Willard ft Bishop
WRB:em
pc Mr. Michael E. Crookston

*2,o^

018

\ Y I J . I - A W I > Iv.

P O

HISHOP.

BJ>

C E 7 A R C.TY

l\r.

27 9

r

l 'AH 847? 1

8 0 1 5 8 6 9*v83

November 3, 1992

Mr. Richard S. Clark, //, Esq.
>4ttorney at Law
590 North 700 West
Provof UT 84601
RE:

Crookston v. Crookston; My File
No. WB88128

Dear Mr. Clark:
Just a note to let you know that unless I receive an answer within five (5) days of
the date of this letter, I am going to enter the default of the former Mrs. Crookston.
Very cordially yours,
WILLARD R BISHOP, P. C.

Willard R Bishop
WRBem
pc Mr Michael E Crooxston
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
ORDER OVERRULING AND DENYING
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
JUfiSftSgNT/^££

Plaintiff,
vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON,

Civil No. 884502229DA
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema

Defendant.
This matter having come before the Court on July 15,1993, pursuant to Plaintiff's
"Notice of Hearing", and Plaintiff having appeared by and through his attorney of record,
Mr. Willard R. Bishop, and Defendant not having appeared personally, but the
Commissioner having been contacted by attorney for Defendant, Mr. Richard S. Clark,
II, during which contact counsel for Defendant informed the Court that he could not
represent Defendant and would forthwith file a "Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel", and
the Court having continued all pending motions based upon the representation that such
a notice of withdrawal would be filed, and no such notice of withdrawal having been

o?V9
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filed, and good cause appearing, the Court having considered the files and records of
the case,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's "Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment" should be and it hereby is, overruled and denied.
RECOMMENDED this

or/Uig«fitr1993.
BY THE COURT:

M A D ! VMM/CD I ZZKAA
^ '
MARLYNNKB.
LEMA
DomesticrRelations Commissioner
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sfafcWILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Plaintiff,

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 884502229DA
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema

REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema,
Domestic Relations Commissioner, on July 15, 1993, pursuant to Plaintiff's "Motion for
Default Judgment", brought up by Plaintiff's "Notice of Hearing". Plaintiff MICHAEL
EUGENE CROOKSTON did not appear personally, but was represented by his attorney
of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop, and Defendant REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON
did not appear personally, and was not represented by counsel. The Court had been
contacted by attorney for Defendant, Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, who indicated that he could
not represent Defendant and, as a result, would forthwith file a "Notice of Withdrawal of
Counsel". Over the objections of Plaintiff's attorney, the Court continued hearing in

2%
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connection with Plaintiff's "Motion for Default". The matter now having been brought
back before the Court by Willard R. Bishop, Plaintiff's counsel, and it appearing that
despite the representations of Richard S. Clark, II, that he would file a notice of
withdrawal of counsel, no such notice of withdrawal has been filed, and good cause
appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That default judgment should be and hereby is, entered in favor of Plaintiff

Michael Eugene Crookston and against Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, in
connection with Plaintiff's "Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" on file in this
action.
2.

That the care, custody, and control of Brian Michael Crookston, Andrea

Christine Crookston, and Kimberiy Denece Crookston, the parties' minor children, should
be and it hereby is, awarded to Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston, subject to rights of
reasonable visitation in Defendant.
3.

That Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston should be and she hereby

is, required to pay to Plaintiff, reasonable child support in accordance with the applicable
guidelines, based upon Plaintiff's current gross income of $2,464.76 per month, and
imputed income to Defendant at the minimal wage rate of $4.25 per hour, 40 hours per
week, 4.3 weeks per month, for an imputed wage of Defendant in the amount of $731.00
2
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per month. Upon presentation of a completed, "Child Support Obligation Worksheet
(Sole Custody)", using three children and the wages stated, Plaintiff shall be entitled to
have the Court execute an "Order of Child Support" in the appropriate amount.
4.

That Plaintiff should be and he hereby is, awarded judgment for his

reasonable attorney fees and costs of Court, $361.98 attorney fees as shown by the
Affidavit of Wiilard R. Bishop, and $55.00 court costs, totaling $416.98; together with
interest upon the declining balance of said judgment at the judgment rate of 5.72% per
annum, from and after the execution of this document until paid in full.
RECOMMENDED this / f ^ d a v of August 1993.
BY THE COURT:

URLYNN B^»$v ^ S i l F '' #

Domestic RelatS^<^imm^?>ner
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801)586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
)

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

ORDER OVERRULING AND DENYING
OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION
OF COMMISSIONER

)

REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, )
)
Defendant.
)

*

Civil No. 8/045O2229DA
Honorable James L Shumate

)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Court on
Tuesdav, February 22, 1994, pursuant to Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston's
"Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner".

Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio

Crookston did not appear personally, but was represented by her attorney of record, Mr.
Stephen W. Julien, Esq., of Utah Legal Services, Inc. Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston
appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R.
Bishop. Argument was had. The Court having reviewed the files and records of the
case, having heard oral argument, and having determined that the files and records of
the case show the consistent color of the efforts of Defendant to frustrate Plaintiff's

£?££
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parental rights insofar as the children of the parties are concerned, and having
determined that the decision of the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations
Commissioner, insofar as it pertains to the "Order Overruling and Denying Motion to Set
Aside Default" and the "Default Judgment" entered in this matter on November 18,1993,
is correct in all respects, from both procedural and substantive standpoints, and good
cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That the "Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner" filed by

Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston should be and it hereby is, overruled and
denied.
2.

That the "Order and Overruling Denying Motion to Set Aside Default" and

the "Default Judgment" executed by the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations
Commissioner, November 18, 1993, and entered on the same date, should be and
hereby are, adopted as the order and decision of the Court; provided, however, that

2

563

02G

pursuant to Rule 6-401(4), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, said decisions have
been the order of the Court from the time of their entry, not having been modified.
DATED this

J

day of <Febfuary, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

JAIvlES" L. SHUMATE, District Judge
<

APPROVED AS TO FORM

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff

STEPHEN W. JULIEN
Attorney for Defendant

3

027

L

^O

j i n

t

-^

l i d -

J

. i i

^ A
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, nka
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON
HACKING,

Trial Court No. 884502229DA
Court of Appeals No. 940190-CA

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
James L Shumate, District Judge, on May 31, 1994, pursuant to Plaintiff's "Order to
Show Cause", Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order Overruling
and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", Plaintiff's "Motion for
Award of Damages", Defendant's "Motion for Specified Visitation", Defendant's "Motion
for Investigation", and Defendant's "Motion to Recalculate or Stay of Judgment of Child
Support and Stay Attorney Fees".

Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston appeared

personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.

VJor)
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Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, now known as Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston
Hacking, also appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr.
Stephen W. Julien. Witnesses were sworn and evidence, both documentary and
testimonial in nature, was adduced. Following argument, based upon a preponderance
of the evidence, the Court now makes and enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about November 18,1993, this Court, in the person of the Honorable

Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations Commissioner, entered default judgment in favor
of Plaintiff and against Defendant. The default judgment awarded Plaintiff Michael
Eugene Crookston the care, custody, and control of Brian Michael Crookston, Andrea
Christine Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston, the parties' minor children.
Defendant was required to pay to Plaintiff, reasonable child support in accordance with
the applicable guidelines which eventually worked out to the amount of $171.81 per
month. Plaintiff was awarded judgment for his reasonable attorney fees and costs of
court, being $361.98 attorney fees and $55.00 court costs, totaling $416.98.
2.

No later than November 25,1993, Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston

Hacking had personal knowledge and notice of the judgment awarding the custody of
the children to Plaintiff. That notice was provided to her by her attorney, Mr. Stephen
W. Julien, both by telephonic communication and by mail. Defendant also knew that the
Court's order required that physical custody of the children be delivered to Plaintiff, and
2
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at all times had the ability to comply with the Court's order. She simply chose not to
comply with the order.
3.

From and after receiving knowledge and notice of the Court's order,

Defendant failed and refused to deliver the children to Plaintiff, and failed and refused
to cooperate with Plaintiff's efforts to obtain the physical custody of the children. Plaintiff
made telephone calls, wrote letters, and involved his attorney in efforts to obtain physical
custody of the children, but without success.
4.

As the result of a hearing held before the Honorable James L Shumate on

February 22, 1994, said District Judge affirmed and upheld the order of the Domestic
Relations Commissioner awarding custody to Plaintiff. That order was executed and filed
on or about March 7, 1994. Following the entry of the order made by the Honorable
James L Shumate, and despite her knowledge and ability to comply therewith,
Defendant continued to fail and refuse to turn the children over to Plaintiff.
5.

As a result of Defendant's failures to abide by the orders of this Court,

Plaintiff was forced to make two trips to the State of Oregon in his efforts to obtain the
custody of his children.

Defendant continued to evade her responsibilities, and

continued her efforts to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining the physical custody of the
children.
6.

Plaintiff's first trip to Oregon took place between March 23, and April 2,

1994. During the first trip, he obtained a writ of assistance from the appropriate District
3
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Court in the State of Oregon, but despite the cooperation and assistance of the
appropriate sheriff's office, was unable to locate and obtain physical custody of the
children. Defendant hid herself and the children to avoid Plaintiff and his efforts to obtain
the children.
7.

Plaintiff thereafter was required to return again to the State of Oregon, to

pick up the children after the Sheriff's office had located and taken them into custody.
Plaintiff finally succeeded in obtaining physical custody of the children on April 8, 1994.
Since April 8,1994, the three children have been in Plaintiff's physical care, custody, and
control.
8.

In connection with his first trip to Oregon, Plaintiff incurred Oregon Court

filing fees of $48.50, Coos' Bay Sheriff's fees of $20.00, plane fare of $274.00, car rental
of $429.21, lodging in the amount of $315.00, gas for a rental car in the amount of
$36.95, food in the amount of $144.03, and lost wages in the amount of $933.12. The
Court finds that, as allowable costs, Plaintiff should be permitted to claim from Defendant
$48.50 court costs, sheriff's fees of $20.00, plane fare of $137.00, food costs in the
amount of $72.01, car rental in the amount of $421.41, lodging in the amount of $315.00,
gasoline in the amount of $36.95, and lost wages of $933.12, totaling $1,984.05.
9.

In connection with the second trip, Plaintiff incurred $768.00 plane fare,

$67.00 car rental, $20.00 gasoline costs, food in the amount of $50.00, and lost wages
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in the amount of $233.28, for a total second trip cost of $1,138.28, all of which costs
should be recovered from Defendant.
10.

Total costs incurred by Plaintiff, which are chargeable to Defendant's failure

to abide by the orders of the Court, despite her ability to comply, come to $3,122.33.
11.

Further, in connection with his attempts to obtain the physical custody of

the children, Plaintiff was required to incur reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
$516.00, which he would not have been required to incur had Defendant obeyed the
Court's orders.
12.

The Court specifically finds that Defendant is guilty of contempt of the

orders of this Court, she having knowledge of the same and the ability to comply
therewith, but voluntarily choosing to disobey.
13.

In mitigation, the Court finds that Defendant has a clear emotional bond

with the children, and that while said bond is no excuse for her failure to abide by the
Court's orders, it certainly mitigates to the extent that no jail time should be imposed, nor
should any fine be imposed. Because of her contempt of Court, however, the Court
finds it appropriate that the costs of the retrieval of the children, as indicated above, plus
-9®fefi€teH^€ reasonable attorney fees associated therewith in the amount of $516.00,
which Defendant cteaHy has the ability to pay, are appropriate and allowable to Plaintiff,
both under applicable provisions of equity and pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A.
78-32-11 (1953, as amended).
5
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14.

With respect to Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order

Overruling and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", and with
respect to Defendant's "Motion to Recalculate or Stay Judgment of Child Support and
Stay Attorney Fees", the Court finds that insofar as said motions pertain to the residence
of the children, the motions are now moot. The children are properly in the physical
care, custody, and control of their father, Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston. Further,
the Court finds that said motions are barred by Defendant's contempt of the orders of
this Court, and specifically, her contempt of the default judgment entered on November
18, 1993, and Judge Shumate's order filed on or about March 7, 1994. Defendant
having conducted herself in contempt of this Court, is not now in a position to ask for
a stay, or for any relief, from the orders of this Court, pursuant to applicable law, she
having "unclean hands" and not having purged herself of contempt.

Payment of

Plaintiff's damages would purge Defendant of her contempt.
15.

With respect to Defendant's "Motion for Specified Visitation", the parties

agreed in open court that Defendant's visitation should be specified to be that set out
in UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as amended), subject to the following restrictions:
A.

That Defendant be enjoined and restrained permanently from

removing the children of the parties from the State of Utah, absent written
permission from Plaintiff, or absent permission of the Court.

6
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B.

That all visitation take place in the presence of a third party adult

acceptable to the parties, and that Janet Blackburn, Defendant's sister-in-law, is
a third-party adult, acceptable to both parties. This does not mean that visitation
should take place only in the presence of Janet Blackburn, but means that the
presence of any other third-party adult acceptable to both parties is also
permissible where visitation is concerned.
16.

With respect to Defendant's "Motion for Investigation", Plaintiff indicated

through his attorney that he, personally, had no objection to the conduct of the
investigation requested by Defendant, and to the providing of a report concerning such
investigation. Counsel for Plaintiff indicated that he did not believe the statute cited by
Defendant as authority for the investigation was applicable. The Court specifically finds
that the provisions of UCA 30-3-5.2 (1953, as amended), are sufficiently broad to include
the allegations made by Defendant, and that an investigation thereunder is appropriate.
17.

From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes and enters the

following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant should be adjudged to be guilty of contempt of the order of this

Court, as set forth in the default judgment dated November 18, 1993, and the "Order
Overruling and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", dated March
7, 1994.
7
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2.

Because and as a result of her contempt of Court, and pursuant to the

provisions of UCA 78-32-11 (1953, as amended), Plaintiff should be granted judgment
against Defendant for his costs and attorney fees in the total amount of $3,638.33,
together with interest thereon, and upon after-accruing costs, at the judgment rate of
5.61% per annum, from and after May 31, 1994 until paid in full.
3.

Defendant's visitation should be specified to be as stated above.

4.

An appropriate investigation should be ordered, pursuant to the provisions

of UCA 30-3-5.2 (1953, as amended).
5.

Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order Overruling and

Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner" and Defendant's "Motion to
Recalculate or Stay of Judgment of Child Support and Stay Attorney Fees" should be
and they hereby are, overruled and denied, for the reasons stated above, including, but
not limited to, the fact that Plaintiff's contempt of Court prevents her from seeking relief
from this Court until such time as she has purged herself of her co; <tempt.
LET AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT AND ORDERS BE ENTERED.
DATED this

?b

day of

Ofr A/

1994.

BY THE COURT:

J£MES L SHUMATE, District Judge
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND ORDERS

vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, nka
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON
HACKING,

Trial Court No. 884502229DA
Court of Appeals No. 940190-CA

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
James L. Shumate, District Judge, on May 31, 1994, pursuant to Plaintiff's "Order to
Show Cause", Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order Overruling
and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", Plaintiff's "Motion for
Award of Damages", Defendant's "Motion for Specified Visitation", Defendant's "Motion
for Investigation", and Defendant's "Motion to Recalculate or Stay of Judgment of Child
Support and Stay Attorney Fees".

Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston appeared

personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.

l
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Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, now known as Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston
Hacking, also appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr.
Stephen W. Julien.

Witnesses were sworn and evidence, both documentary and

testimonial in nature, was adduced. Argument was had. The Court having made and
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking should be and she

hereby is, adjudged and decreed to be in contempt of the orders of this Court, as
contained in the Default Judgment entered on or about November 18, 1993, and the
Order Overruling and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner, entered
on or about March 7, 1994.
2.

That because of her contempt, Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston should

be and he hereby is awarded judgment against Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston
Hacking, and that Plaintiff shall have and recover from Defendant his damages in the
sum of $3,638.33, which amount consists of $3,122.33 costs of Plaintiff retrieving
physical custody of the children, and $516.00 reasonable attorney fees incurred in
connection with Plaintiff's efforts to obtain physical custody of the children. The total
judgment principal amount of $3,638.33, together with accruing costs, shall bear interest
at the judgment rate of 5.61 % per annum from and after May 31,1994, until paid in full.
2
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3.

That because Plaintiff consented to and agreed that Defendant's visitation

rights be specified, and agreed with Defendant as to the nature of those visitation rights,
Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking should be and she hereby is, awarded
reasonable rights of visitation with the parties' minor children, as set forth and delineated
in UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as amended), subject to the following restrictions:
A.

That Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking should be and she

hereby is, permanently enjoined and restrained from removing the parties' minor
children from the State of Utah, without first having obtained written permission
of Plaintiff, or alternatively, written permission of the Court.
B.

That all visitation exercised by Defendant shall take place in the

presence of a third party adult acceptable to both parties, including, but not
limited to, Janet Blackburn, Defendant's sister-in-law, who is an acceptable third
party adult.
4.

That, pursuant to the provisions of UCA 30-3-5.2 (1953, as amended), the

division of family services within the Department of Social Services, in accordance with
Part 5, Chapter 4 of Title 62A, Utah Code Annotated, should be and hereby is, required
to conduct an investigation, and to conduct the same within 30 days hereof. Copies of
the report of said investigation are to be provided to counsel, the original report being
filed with the Court. Plaintiff had no objection to the entry of this particular order,

3

038
//L/O

5.

That Defendant's "Motion for Stay of Default Judgment and Order

Overruling and Denying Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner", and
Defendant's "Motion to Recalculate or Stay of Judgment of Child Support and Stay
Attorney Fees" should be and they hereby are, overruled and denied, for the reasons
that, among other things, said motions are moot with respect to the residence and
custody of the parties' minor children, and for the further reason that, being in contempt
of the orders of this Court, Defendant is barred from seeking any relief from the Court
until such time as she has purged herself of her contempt.
DATED this I f )

day of _

. 1994.
BY THE COURT:
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

JUDGMENT FOR DELINQUENT
CHILD SUPPORT

)
)
)

Trial Court No. 884502229DA
Court of Appeals No. 940190-CA

vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
James L Shumate, District Judge, on May 31, 1994, pursuant to various matters then
pending before the Court. Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston appeared personally and
was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Defendant Rebecca
Ann Batio Crookston, now known as Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking, also
appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Stephen W.
Julien, Esq. Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented. It appearing to the
Court that the care, custody, and control of the parties' minor children was awarded to
Plaintiff on or about November 18, 1993, and that in connection with the award of such

i/i,;,
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custody to Plaintiff, Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff child support, and the Court
having found that Defendant has not paid any child support to Plaintiff, and is delinquent
in child support payments from November 18, 1993 through May 31, 1994, and the
Court having determined that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for such delinquent child
support, and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston should be and he hereby is,

awarded judgment against Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, now known as
Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston Hacking, for delinquent child support from and after
November 18, 1993 through May 31, 1994.
2.

That Plaintiff shall have and recover from Defendant the following amounts

of delinquent child support:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

$ 68.72
$171.81
$171.81
$171.81
$171.81
$171.81

For November, 1993, representing 12/30ths of $171.81.
For December, 1993.
For January, 1994.
For March, 1994.
For April, 1994.
For May, 1994.

$927.77

TOTAL JUDGMENT PRINCIPAL

WJ
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3.

That the declining balance of the total judgment principal amount of

$927.77, together with after accruing costs, shall bear interest at the judgment rate of
5.61% per annum until paid in full.
DATED this X4)

day of

KJ Li

lt\

1994.

BY THE COURTS*?
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